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Are you looking for how i retired at age 59 english edition? Then you definitely come to the right place to get the how i retired at age 59 english edition. Look for any ebook online with simple steps. But if you want to get it to your computer, you can download much of ebooks now. Retirement Retirement is the withdrawal from one's position or occupation or from one's active working life.

A person may also semi-retire by reducing work hours. An increasing number of individuals are choosing to put off this point of total retirement, by selecting to exist in the emerging state of pre-tirement. Some people who have retired from a position with a pre-nominal title, particularly Two additional divisions were held in reserve along both banks of the lower Morava Valley. The Third Army Group consisted of: the Fifth Army, which had four divisions and two brigades to cover the Romanian border from the Iron Gate up to Kriva Palanka; three additional divisions under the army's jurisdiction cvered the adjacent sector to the south, extending to the Greek frontier; and the Third Army, composed of four divisions and one separate battalion, which was deployed along the Albanian border from Lake Ohridsko to Lake Shadarsko.

One reserve division was stationed in thd Skoplje area. This command was responsible for the defense of the Adriatic coast from the Bay of Kotorski to Gospic. Because of the political situation, the inadequate rail and road nets, and the poor organization of the Army as a v;hole, the Yugoslav defense forces were committed piecemeal.

The frontier defenses, although built around favorable terrain features, lacked depth and usually confined themselves to thj immediate border environs. When hostilities began on 6 April, the Yugoslav Army was still in the mil! As a result, the disposition of troops behind the 1,mile border was totally inadequate. Some of the border security battalions were on a war footing, but even they were still understrength.

As late as 3 April the Yugoslavs started shifting troop units from the Sarajevo area to the Bulgarian frontier, liven at that tine there were no strategic reserves whatsoever in the Ljubljana sector. Political leaders repeatedly stated that Yugoslavia was determined not to provoke a German armed attack. Dill found that the Yugoslav ministers failed to realize the imminence of their country's peril. Their mood and outlook seemed to indicate that they had months to make their decisions and enforce their plans, whereas in reality only a few days were to elapse before tha Germans launched their attack.

On the following day the Fuehrer arrived at a small station on the single-track railroad line leading from Yliener Neustadt southward to Fuerstenberg fifty miles east of Graz. There, his special train and that of the National Defense Branch halted in front of the northern and southern exits respectively of a tunnel that leads through the Alps south of Aspang. From these locations the trains could easily be pulled into the tunnel in the event of enemy air attacks.

While the two trains remained in the area, the entire line was blocked to normal traffic, It v;as from this vantage point that Hitler directed the Balkan campaigns until 25 April, when he returned to Berlin. To support the impending operations in the Balkans, plans to reinforce the air arm were made and executed by the Fourth Air Force under the command of General der Flieger Lieutenant General Alexander Loehr, whose headquarters was then located in Vienna.

It was he who established such an outstanding record in supporting the slashing armored thrusts during the Battle of France. Between November and February , a force of over planes, including long-range bombers, dive-bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance aircraft, had gradually been built up in Romania and Bulgaria. By 27 March, when the Yugoslav revolt occurred, there were fighters and reconnaissance planes in Romania, and bombers and dive-bombers in Bulgaria. Early in April still more air roirrTornomerito mire rushed to tho Balkans. From as far away as.

France, Africa, and Sicily about additional aircraft of sll four types were brought up and readied for action within ten days. The fighter and reconnaissance craft were sent to fields near Arad, Deva, and Turnu-Severin in western Romania, all within easy striking distance of Belgrade. The long-range bombers were to operate from fields at Wiener Neustadt and near Sofiya, northwest and southeast of the Yugoslav capital, at and miles distance, respectively.

The disposition and order of battle of the various attack groups under Second Army were as follows Appendix I :. The only division originally assigned to this corps was the 1st Mountain Division.

This corps was to form the main effort of the southward thrust with the st Light Infantry and d and d Infantry Divisions. Since these forces did not arrive in time and were not needed for the operation, they were placed in the Army High Command reserve. The following units were assigned to the panzer group and diverted to participate in the Yugoslav campaign: 1.

The forces assigned to Second Army had to be shifted from France and Germany as well as from the Russian border. Consequently, the forces that were designated to participate in the Yugoslav campaign had to be rerouted toward the south, some of them even in the midst of their west-east movement. Several efficient railroad lines running from north to south were available for the movement. Two additional lines terminated in Passau, one via Nuremburg and the other via Munich.

The line from Prague via Pilsen to Vienna was also available but had only a limited capacity. The movements from Vienna and Passau through the Alps into the detraining areas around Graz and into western Hungary presented more complicated problems. Since the capacities of the feeder lines and detraining points were considered inadequate, some elements were forced to detrain in Vienna and Salzburg and continue the movement to the assembly areas by road. The Graz area and western Styria were particularly difficult to reach.

Here, the feeder lines traversed the Alps and were consequently of very limited capacity. For this reason it became imperative to include the western tip of Hungary as an assembly area for some of the German attack forces. After Hungary had agreed to the use of its territory, the assembly of the German Second Army proceeded as follows: 1.

Graz and western Styria were designated as assembly areas for all infantry divisions. Three railroad lines with the following daily feeder capacity were available in those areas.


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However, only fifty-two military trains could be dispatched from Vienna to Bruck since eight trains destined for Italy were needed daily to haul coal over that stretch. These trains had to be kept running on schedule in order to conceal the German concentrations from the Yugoslavs as long as possible. The line Salzburg - Spittal - Klagenfurt could also carry eighteen trains daily, but only vith half the normal load because of the steep gradients across the Alps. The daily detraining capacity of the Bruck - Graz - Klagenfurt area was seventy-eight trains, or the equivalent of the combat elements of two infantry divisions.

Consequently, nil of the rear echelon elements of those divisions hod to detrain in the Vienna area, capable of handling trains n day, and in Salzburg, where forty-eight additional trains could be unloaded. The divisional service units then had to roach the assembly areas by marching overland. However, since road conditions were poor at this time of the year, snow-clearing detachments had to be provided to keep the Salzburg - Liezen - Bruck and Vienna - Bruck -Graz roads clear. These road3 also had to be used by those divisions that moved solely by motor transportation.

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Since rigid traffic control was enforced and traffic regulations were strictly adhered to, the execution of these movements did not entail any undue delay. The area around Nagyknnizsa was selected for the assembly of the two panzer and one motorized infantry divisions subordinated to XLVI Panzer Corps headquarters. Some of the tracked vehicles moved up on the Vienna - Sopron - Nagykanizsa railroad line, whose feeder capacity was twelve trains a day. Other elements detrained in the Budapest - Szekesfehervar area and continued on to Nagykanizsa by road.

Some of the motor vahicles could evjn CCI.


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G directly from Vienna by road since the Hungarian roads were clear of snow. The above-mentioned capacity figures of railroads and highways were eventually reached, but not before many difficulties had been overcome. The main problem was that no preparatory work had been started until the evening of 27 March.

The system of classifying all major railroad lines according to their capacity, introduced at the beginning of the war, and the method applied in processing military rail movements both proved efficient during this emergency. The maximum performance schedule, which required the almost complete stoppage of all nonmilitary traffic, had to be resorted to only on the Austrian railroads.

Aside from conserving personnel and materiel, the adherence to normnl train schedules whenever possible permitted the Germans to camouflage tlie movements to the assembly areas right up to the time when the first contingents arrived at the detraining points. Transportation bottlenecks in the Graz area made it necessary to resort to a complicated system of segregating troop shipments.

Only vital combat elements could be included in the forward echelon of the infantry divisions. All divisional units that could be temporarily dispensed with, especially the bulk of the supply trains, were either held back for later shipment or sent to detraining points located far to the rear.

This was the first time that such a divorcement of combat and service echelons became necessary and was put into effect. During its subsequent application in Russia, this improvised measure was further perfected and proved to be invaluable. The co-operative attitude of the Hungarian transportation personnel made it possible to increase the capacity of the Nagy-kanizsa detraining area in record time. The German Movement Control headquarters in Budapest, recently transferred from Bratislava, was responsible for all preparations that had to be completed within three days.

All loading ramps in the area had to be enlarged and reinforced to handle heavy loads, new sidings had to be laid, and adequate antiaircraft protection had to be provided. To increase the capacity of the railroads in Hungary and Bulgaria, the Army railroad transportation agencies formed a reserve pool of locomotives and box cars suitable for troop transports. Special measures also had to be taken to ensure the flow of supplies into the Balkans once the campaign had started.

The line Belgrade - His - Salonika, the only one capable of handling fully loaded trains, was vitally needed ior this purpose. Railroad engineer troops and construction equipment had to be reserved for the immediate restoration of this line aftor it had fallen into German hands. The Bulgarian railroads were connected with the Belgrade -Nis - Salonika line. To avoid time-consuming reloading operations, troop and supply trains destined for Bulgaria were loaded at "Balkan Capacity," which was two thirds of the normal weight.

This necessitated a rearrangement of the loading and unloading schedules, which was accomplished with the co-oparation of the Bulgarian General Staff and railroad authorities. The Danube as a Route of Transportation. The Danube was of vital importance to the German war effort. Oil from Romania and Agricultural products from the Balkans were shipped to Germany along the great waterway. With the outbreak of hostilities in Yugoslavia, all Danube shipping would have to be suspended; its resumption would depend on the progress of the military operations as well as on the extent of demolitions and mine obstacles.

It was known that the Yugoslavs had prepared some acts of sabotage along the Danube and intended to mine the Iron Gate. At the defile of the Iron Gate, where the Danube forms the boundary between Yugoslavia and Romania, a fairly long stretch of the river if cnnalized. Because of the numerous locks and dams this portion of the river was extremely vulnerable.

Therefore, a Gernan engineer training battalion, forming part of the military mission stationed in Romania, was assigned the task of seizing and protecting this vital area. The Danube played a minor role as a military route of transportation.

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The available shipping facilities were barely sufficient for the transportation of essential materials. Although the military transportation agencies had repeatedly pointed to the urgency jf a large-scale construction program of Danube vessels, Hitler had refused to allocate the necessary steel for this purpose.

In the two beat railroad lines in the Balkans ran from Belgrade via Nis to Salonika and Sofiya, respectively.

The use of these two vital supply arteries was denied to the German Army. Therefore the following precautionary steps had to be taken to ensure the uninterrupted flow of supplies to the Twelfth Army forces in Bulgaria:. Heavy truck transportation units at the disposal of the Army High Command were fully loaded and transferred to Romania and from there to Bulgaria. A number of barges, loaded with a total of 10, tons of supplies, and a tanker were assembling at Vienna destined for Belgrade, where a supply base was to be established as soon as possible.

Another river fleet, carrying 16, tons of rations and ammunition, was standing by on the Danube between Regensburg and Vienna. The vessels were destined for the German forces in Romania and were to sail down the Danube as soon as the waterway had been reopened to shipping. Providing Second Army with the necessary supplies presented no particular problems and caused no delay in the launching of the operations. When surgical hospitals failed to arrive, for example, they were replaced by additional hospital trains.

Political and Strategic Planning

The logistical planning was greatly facilitated by the fact that beginning in the summer of a supply base had gradually bean built up near Vienna. It had not been established for a campaign against Yugoslavia, but because Soviet political activities in the Balkans during had prompted the Army High command to stockpile large quantities of supplies at the gateway to southeastern Europe.

The existence of this base made it possible to meat the sudden and unexpected demands of the Yugoslav campaign without shifting supplies from the interior of Germany, a step which would have delayed the operation considerably. During the winter of - 41, Second Army headquarters in Munich had been responsible for training the divisions stationed in southern Germany and the former Czechoslovak territory. When Second Army headquarters was alerted for the Yugoslav attack, its training mission was assumed by Eleventh Army.

Toward the end of March no forces other than a few infantry divisions were available in Germany for immediate commitment. Those armored and motorized infantry divisions that happened to be in Germany at the time were in the process of activation, reorganization, or rehabilitation. The mechanized divisions needed by Second Army therefore had to be drawn from France, and their transfer to the Balkans was bound to result in delays. The only available mountain division, whose employment was essential for the successful conduct of the Yugoslav campaign, also had to be brought east, from France.

Similar difficulties were encountered in assembling the necessary GHQ units and artillery, engineer, and service troops. The following chart shows the problem involved in assembling the divisions assigned to Second Army:. The actual movements of these units took place in the following manner: Using organic transportation, Second Army headquarters moved from Munich to Radegund, near Graz, on 2 April. The main body of the 1st Mountain Division was moving by motor transportation from Landsberg, northeast of Berlin, to Vienna.

On 5 April the forward echelon of the division was ordered not to dismount in Vienna as previously planned, but to continue the movement to its assembly area near Klagenfurt, where it was to arrive by the evening of 8 April, However, the bulk of it's combat elements did not get to Klagenfurt until 9 April, the eve of D Day, while most of the service troops joined the division piecemeal between 13 and 15 April, well after the start of operation.

Whereas LI Corps headquarters arrived in its assembly area in good time, the divisions under its command encountered many difficulties. The d and d Infantry Divisions had been ordered to entrain on 2 April. By 6 April about two thirds of each division had detrained in Graz, and both were completely unloaded by 9 April. Meanwhile, a truck transportation regiment, then located in Paris, was ordered to proceed to Czechoslovakia from where it was to move the st Light Infantry Division to it's assembly area. Advance elements of this division were to be in line by 9 April.

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However, icy roads delayed the movement to such an extent that the tail elements did not reach their destination until 15 April. From the very beginning, every effort was made to speed up the concentration of LII Infantry Corps, but with little avail. By 11 April, after the attacks were well under way, the Army High Command was still in the dark as to when this corps might become operational. The 79th and th Infantry Divisions, which were to form the second attack wave under LII Corps, were to detrain close to the border.

It was 12 April when the first ten trains, carrying the 79th Infantry Division pulled into the assembly area. The advance echelon of the 16th Motorized Infantry Division arrived in Vienna by rail on 8 April and immediately proceeded from there to the concentration area in Hungary by organic transportation.

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By the evening of 7 April, the 14th Panzer Division arrived in Magykanizsa, while the 8th Panzer Division assembled its forces to the north of Lake Blation. Although the snow had melted, the movements all three divisions were hampered by heavy rains, and it was necessary to provide each with additional traffic control units to avoid undue stoppages. The Luftwaffe opened the assault on Yugoslavia by conducting a saturation-type bombing raid on the capital in the early morning hours of 6 April.